





Abstract: Samuel Johnson claimed to have refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone. It 
is generally thought that Johnson misses the point of Berkeley's immaterialism 
for a rather obvious reason: Berkeley never denied that the stone feels solid, but 
only that the stone could exist independently of any mind. I argue that Johnson 
was on the right track. On my interpretation, Johnson’s idea is that because the 
stone feels to resist our effort, the stone seems to have causal powers. But if ap-
pearances are to be taken at face value, as Berkeley insists, then the stone has 
causal powers. I argue that such causal powers threaten not only Berkeley’s view 
that only minds are active, but also, and more fundamentally, his central claim 
that sensible things depend on perception. 
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Johnson famously tried to refute Berkeley by kicking a stone: 
After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berke-
ley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the 
universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it 
is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, 
striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, — "I refute 
it thus." (Boswell, 1826, 370) 
Johnson’s “refutation” is not only widely held to miss the point, it is held to do so 
for an obvious reason. Berkeley denies that the stone exists independently of its 
perception. As he stresses, this is wholly compatible with the stone feeling solid. 
Johnson’s refutation would seem so question-begging that a sophism was named 
after it: argumentum ad lapidem. 
I here argue that Johnson’s refutation is indeed a refutation. I am not the first 
to attempt a rehabilitation of Johnson’s kick. H. F. Hallett (1947) and D. L. Patey 
(1986) have already put forward extensive re-evaluations of the kick.1 Indeed, I 
am sympathetic to their respective central claims. Hallett maintains that John-
son’s refutation is primarily targeted at Berkeley’s view that only minds are ac-
tive. Patey, meanwhile, maintains that Johnson’s refutation appeals to the view 
that the experience of resistance to our voluntary efforts presents us with the 
!! 
1 To whom Silver (1993) may be added. 
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mind-independence of its objects. While these ideas tend in the right direction, 
in order to refute Berkeley’s immaterialism we still need to do two things: 
± First, with respect to Hallett’s proposal, we need to understand the connec-
tion between immaterialism and the view that only minds can produce ef-
fects in nature: why can’t immaterialists agree that stones are active, so long
as stones and their activity depend on their perception?
± Second, with respect to Patey’s interpretation, we need to address the worry
that in appealing to the resistance of the stone to our will, Johnson changes
the subject: Berkeley challenges the idea that perceptual objects are existen-
tially independent from our perception of them, to which Johnson seems to
answer that objects are exist independently from our will. Such an answer, on 
the face of it, misses the point. Worse still, it expresses a view – namely, the
will-independency of sensible things – with which Berkeley explicitly agrees. 
In what follows, I hope to answer to these two concerns. First, I argue in section 
1 that what Johnson seeks to establish by kicking the stone is not that the stone 
feels solid, but that the stone feels mind-independent. Such an experience of 
mind-independence may be understood as arising from ordinary perception, or 
as arising merely from a specific kind of experience: the experience of resistance 
to our effort. Next, I argue in section 2 that the idea that ordinary perception pre-
sents us with the mind-independency of its objects is untenable and unlikely to 
be the idea behind Johnson’s kick in any case. Then, in section 3, I argue that 
Johnson endorses the plausible thought that, in experiencing resistance to our 
will, we are presented with the mind-independency of the stone. Finally, section 
4 argues that relying on this form of mind-independence to refute Berkeley is not 
as question-begging as it might first appear. To the contrary, while independency 
from the will and independency from perception are indeed distinct, I argue that 
the kind of will-independency displayed by the stone entails its independency 
from perception. 
# Johnson’s Refutation Reconstructed 
What is immaterialism, the view that Johnson intends to rebut? Let us begin by 
defining sensible things, as Berkeley understands them: 
Sensible things: the immediate objects of perception, e.g., heat, colour, exten-
sion, motion, solidity…. and collections thereof. 
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Do sensible things exist independently of our perception of them? Those who 
answer positively, such as Thomas Reid, are called direct realists. Those who an-
swer negatively divide into two sub-camps, depending on the answer they give 
to a second question: is there some mind-independent unthinking substance be-
hind those mind-dependent sensible things? Proponents of the positive answer 
are, with Locke (or at least on the standard interpretation) indirect realists. Those 
who answer ‘no’ embrace Berkeley’s phenomenalism or immaterialism (here I 
shall equate the two).  
Phenomenalism/immaterialism: sensible things existentially depend on our 
perception of them, and there is no mind-independent unthinking substance be-
yond them. 
What, then, is Johnson’s refutation of immaterialism? The common (and I 
think uncharitable) interpretation goes as follows: 
P1 The stone feels solid. 
C1 Some sensible things seem solid. (from P1, by existential generalization) 
C2 Some sensible things are mind-independent. (from C1, allegedly)2 
The move from C1 to C2 is, of course, unwarranted: there is no logical connection 
between seeming solid and being mind-independent. 
The first step on the way to fixing the refutation is to modify P1. What Johnson 
wants to call our attention to, I suggest, is not the fact that the stone feels solid, 
but that the stone feels mind-independent. With this amendment, the refutation 
reads as follows: 
P1’ The stone feels mind-independent. 
C1’ Some sensible things seem mind-independent. (from P1, by existential gener-
alization) 
C2 Some sensible things are mind-independent. (from C1, allegedly) 
Again, the move from C1’ to C2 is unwarranted, but we are getting closer since the 
two propositions now bear on the same property: mind-independence. The prem-
ise needed in order the render the argument valid is now clear: 
P1’ The stone feels mind-independent. 
!! 
2 The ‘solidity’ reading of the argument was proposed early on by Kearney, in an added note to 
Edmund Malone, who helped Boswell to compile his biography, as well as providing extensive 
annotation: “Dr Johnson seems to have been imperfectly acquainted with Berkeley’s doctrine; 
and his experiment only proves that we have the sensation of solidity, which Berkeley did not 
deny. He admitted that we had sensations or ideas usually called sensible qualities, one of which 
is solidity: he only denied the existence of matter.” (Boswell 1826: 370) 
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C1’ Some sensible things seem mind-independent. (from P1, by existential gener-
alization) 
P2 Sensible things are as they seem. 
C2 Some sensible things are mind-independent. (from C1, P2) 
This argument is valid (one quibble is the move from “feel” in P1 to “seem” in C1’, 
which is, I assume, unproblematic). I believe that this is the argument that John-
son had in mind. This may sound like a bold claim. After all, Johnson’s refutation 
is highly enthymematic: from no premise – but merely a gesture – a conclusion 
is drawn. Can such a terse argument really contain two premises? 
Let us begin with P2. One may wonder whether appealing to such a premise 
is not question-begging in the context of an argument against immaterialism. Af-
ter all, isn’t it an obvious consequence of immaterialism that things are not as 
they seem? Berkeley answers negatively. P2 is in fact a strongly Berkeleyan prem-
ise. One chief motivation driving Berkeley’s immaterialism is precisely to rebut 
the sceptics, who are defined as those who refuse to trust their senses: “I am of a 
vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them.” 
(Berkeley: Three Dialogues: 229).3  
The main point of immaterialism – bracketing theological considerations – 
is to enable one to take appearances at face value. P2, therefore, is not a premise 
that Johnson either needs to defend or state: his opponent grants it. 
This, then, leaves us with P1’: the claim that the stone feels mind-independ-
ent. This is, I believe, the bone of contention – der Stein des Anstosses – between 
Johnson and Berkeley. P1’ is the only premise that Johnson needs to state and 
defend. He does this by kicking the stone.  
Now, there are two main ways of interpreting P1’:  
1. It is a feature of ordinary perception to present us with the mind-independ-
ency of its objects.  
2. Only a very specific form of experience (viz., the experience of resistance to 
our will) embeds a presentation of mind-independence.  
I argue in the next section that the first proposal is untenable and unlikely to be 
the idea behind Johnson’s kick in any case. 
!! 
3 Pagination refers throughout to the Luce and Jessop’s edition. See also Three Dialogues 113, 
173–4, 215; Principles §40, §101 and Saporiti (2008) for discussion. 
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$ Experiencing Mind-Independence: Ordinary 
Perception 
Before considering whether ordinary perception presents us with the mind-inde-
pendency of its objects, let us take pause to distinguish clearly between two ques-
tions that we are concerned with here. Recall that we began with the question: 
are sensible things mind-independent? We are now interested in the question: do 
sensible things seem mind-independent? Call the former, the question of the real-
ity of appearances, and the latter the question of the appearance of reality.4 These 
two questions are distinct and in principle independent, unless, as we saw, one 
admits that sensible things are as they seem, and they seem mind-independent. 
In such a case, phenomenalism is refuted.  
Focusing henceforth on the question of the appearance of reality, Berkeley 
consistently answered negatively to that question: 
[our senses] do not inform us that things exists without the mind, or unperceived. (Princi-
ples, §18; see also Three Dialogues: 201) 
On this, he was followed by Hume:  
As to the independency of our perceptions on ourselves, this can never be an object of the 
senses. (Hume 2007: 1.4.2.) 
As well as Reid:  
It is evident, that we cannot, by reasoning from our sensations, collect the existence of bod-
ies at all. This has been proved by unanswerable arguments by the Bishop of Cloyne, and 
by the author of the “Treatise of Human Nature” (Reid 2000: 687) 
Let us make a quick comment on Reid. It may be found surprising that Reid (a 
direct realist who subscribed to the mind-independence of sensible things) nev-
ertheless rejects the view that sensible things are experienced as mind-independ-
ent. However, on his account, our belief in the mind-independency of perceptual 
objects is not grounded in our experience of their mind-independency, but in our 
!! 
4 Siegel (2006) draws basically the same distinction between these two questions, and ad-
dresses a version of second one. She doesn’t address however the question of whether or not 
perceptual objects seem existentially independent from us, but the question of whether or not 
they seem to have and keep the same properties independently of the location from which we 
perceive them. 
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very nature. Although mind-independence cannot be perceived, we cannot help 
believing that what we perceive exists independently from us.  
Clearly, then, even direct realists were prone the reject the view that mind-
independence can be perceived at the time. This stands in stark contrast with 
contemporary philosophers of perception, who tend to take P1’ for granted:  
Mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as […] an immediate consciousness 
of the existence of things outside us. (Strawson 1979) 
All (or almost all) serious theories of perception agree that our perceptual experience seems 
as if it were an awareness of a mind-independent world. (Crane 2005)5 
Perceptual experience subjectively presents as if it puts us in touch with mind-independent 
objects. (Allais 2015: 53) 
I side with Berkeley, Hume, and Reid. Ordinary perception, I believe, is silent with 
respect to the mind-independency of its objects. Why? One argument against the 
possibility of experiencing mind-independence is given by Hume. After having 
argued that the claims ‘x continues to exist when unperceived’ and ‘x exists inde-
pendently from its perception’ entail each other, Hume continues:  
To begin with the SENSES, ‘tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the 
notion of the continu’d existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. 
For that is a contradiction in terms, and supposes that the senses continue to operate, even 
after they have ceas’d all manner of operation. (Hume 2007: 1.4.2.) 
Perceiving independence would be as hopeless as trying to see whether the light 
in the fridge stays on when we close the door. In order to perceive something as 
mind-independent we would have to perceive it when it is unperceived—a patent 
impossibility. 
Hume’s argument is, however, flawed. It relies on the assumption that the 
only way to perceive the mind-independence of x is to perceive x when it is not 
perceived. This is arguably too strong a requirement. In order to perceive x as 
mind-independent, we do not need to perceive it as actually existing unper-
ceived: we only need to perceive it as possibly existing unperceived. That is, if, 
while seeing x we have the impression that x would exist even if we were not per-
ceiving it, then we are presented with x’s mind-independence. No contradiction 
ensues. 
!! 
5 This so, Crane suggests, because “One’s awareness of the objects of one’s perceptual experi-
ences does not seem to be an awareness of something which depends on experience for their 
existence.” But this is a non-sequitur: perception might simply be mute with respect to the mind-
(in)dependency of its objects, as I shall argue below. 
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Such an answer nevertheless raises new worries that, I believe, renders the 
view that mind-independency is presented in ordinary perception highly implau-
sible. Though no more contradictory, the perception of independence now ap-
pears very demanding. It requires that, together with the perception of the object, 
we be presented: 
1. With counterfactual states of affairs: we must be aware of a situation distinct 
from the one we are actually in, in which the object exists while we do not 
perceive it. 
2. With negative states of affairs: we must be aware of a situation distinct from the 
one we are actually in, in which the object exists while we do not perceive it. 
3. With reflexive states of affairs: we must be aware of a situation distinct from the 
one we are actually in, in which the object exists while we do not perceive it.6 
It has been claimed in various places that modal properties or states of affairs can 
be perceived, that negative properties or states can be perceived, and that reflex-
ive properties or states of affairs can be perceived. But to claim that all these three 
suspect kinds of properties are presented together in all perceptions is another 
matter. That a presentation of a counterfactual, negative, reflective states of af-
fairs is embedded in every ordinary perception strikes as implausible. It is not the 
case that, looking at a ladybird, we see, on top of its shape, redness, motion, etc., 
its property of possibly existing unperceived by us. 
One may reply that I am here using “perception” in too conservative a sense, and 
that a more liberal account of the contents of perception would capably accom-
modate the complexity of perceptual content. But recall that we are here as-
sessing Berkeley’s claim that perception cannot present us with the mind-inde-
pendency of its objects. If we are to reply that perception does present us with the 
mind-independency of its objects, we need to use “perception” in the same way 
that he does. And he uses the term in a conservative manner: everything that is 
perceived is perceived directly and consists in sensory qualities. Even if there is a 
sense of “perception” in which the counterfactual-negative-reflexive property of 
“possibly existing unperceived” is systematically perceived (which I doubt), re-
lying on that sense is irrelevant in the present context. Berkeley would retort that 
in his terminology we are merely claiming that mind-independence can be in-
ferred or conceived (a view he also rejected, for different reasons).  
!! 
6 A point rightly pressed by Hume: “Now if the senses presented our impressions as external to, 
and independent of, ourselves both the objects and ourselves must be obvious to our senses, 
otherwise they cou'd not be compar'd by these faculties. The difficulty, then, is how far we are 
ourselves the objects of our senses.” (Hume 2007: 1.4.2) 
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But perhaps we are being led astray by the tacit assumption that mind-inde-
pendence should be understood modally. Thus far, we have implicitly defined 
mind-dependence in terms of possible unperceived existence: 
Modal account of mind-independence: x is mind-independent =df it is possible 
that x exists without being perceived. 
But there are reasons to think that this modal account of mind-independence 
is mistaken. Suppose, as many believe, that God exists, that he is a necessary be-
ing, that he sees everything, that he created the world and its laws a long time 
ago and that he no longer intervenes in the world except for sporadic miracles. 
According to the modal conception of independence, the world then existentially 
depends on the perception of God: no objects are real since nothing could possi-
bly exist without his perception.7 But this is strongly counter-intuitive: for even if 
the world cannot exist without being perceived by God, it is not the case here that 
the world exists because God perceives it. Instead of being a sense-datum of God, 
the world appears to follow its course independently of God perceiving it.8 Thus, 
the modal view of mind-independence appears to be false: possibly existing un-
perceived is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for existential independ-
ence. The general problem with the modal approach to existential independence, 
to paraphrase Fine, is that it registers only the fact that in each world where x 
exists, y exists, but it remains silent about the source of such a modal correlation. 
The correlation may be due to the dependent nature of x, but it may also be due 
to the necessary nature of y. We want to exclude the latter case. How can we do 
so?  
As an alternative, K. Fine (1995) and J. Lowe (1998) have proposed to define 
existential dependence with the help of the notion of the identity (or essence) of 
an object. The notion of essence is taken to be modally irreducible: the essence 
of a thing is what makes it what it is: its real definition (Fine 1994). Every essential 
property is a necessary property but not every necessary property is an essential 
one. To take an example from Fine: it is necessary that Socrates is distinct from 
the Eiffel Tower, but this is not essential to him. The idea is then that x depends 
on y if and only if the existence of x necessarily implies the existence of y in virtue 
of the identity of x. In other words, the source of the necessary correlation must 
rely on the dependent object in order to avoid the conclusion that everything is 
!! 
7 I’ve adapted the God example proposed by Simons (1987: 295) to the case of perception. For 
more detailed criticisms of the modal conception of dependence, see Fine (1994, 1995); Lowe 
(1998, chap. 6); Correia, (2005). Jenkins (2005) applies this criticism to the definition of realism 
in terms of mind-independence. 
8 If God is passive or not almighty, the world may even end up failing to comply to his will. 
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dependent on necessary beings. Thus, although it is necessary that if John exists, 
then 2+2 = 4, John is not ontologically dependent on 2+2 being 4 because this 
necessity does not find its source in John’s nature. This solves our problem of the 
all-seeing God: while it is true in this situation that the world cannot exist without 
being perceived by God, this is not true in virtue of the nature of the world –but in 
virtue of the nature of God. What the world is doesn’t necessitate that God per-
ceives it. Thus, we arrive at the following essential definition of independence:  
Essential account of mind-independence:  x is mind-independent =df it is not 
true in virtue of the nature of x that x exists only if it is perceived. 
On this account, the mind-independence of x is compatible with its being 
necessarily perceived.9 Furthermore, this account, one might think, paves the 
way for the possibility of perceiving the mind-independence of perceptual ob-
jects, since this no longer entails perceiving such objects as possibly existing un-
perceived.  
However, such hopes are vain.10 Yes, we have gotten rid of modal properties 
in the content of the alleged perception of the mind-independence of external 
objects: we have replaced them with essential ones, and these are arguably less 
problematic. Thus, those who uphold the revelation thesis about colours, for in-
stance, find it natural to claim that visual perception presents us with the nature 
of colours. Note first, however, that perceiving mind-independence of some ob-
ject still requires us to perceive some negative and reflexive properties of it: that 
of not being essentially such that one’s existence requires one’s being perceived.  
Second, the replacement of modal properties by essential ones may be a 
merely pyrrhic victory. In order to experience that it is not in the essence of a to 
require b, one must be aware that nothing in the nature of a requires b. For this, 
one must experience that one is presented with the whole nature of a. Short of 
!! 
9 Correia (2005) has given another definition of dependence in terms of ground, which avoids 
the reference to essences or natures while still excluding the trivial dependence on necessary 
beings. According to Correia, x depends on y iff “y’s existing helps makes x exist.” That is, one 
entity existentially depends on another when its existence is explained (in an objective sense), 
or grounded in, the existence of the other. From this, mind-independence can be defined as fol-
lows:  
Foundational account of mind-independence: x is mind-independent =df x’s existence is not 
grounded in x’s being perceived. 
The foundational account also avoids the conclusion that the world is a sense-datum of the all-
seeing God, for clearly, in this example, the world does not exist because God perceived it. The 
differences between the essential and foundational accounts of mind-independence can be ig-
nored for our present purpose. What matters is that in both cases mind-independence is no 
longer defined in terms of possible existence unperceived. 
10 Notwithstanding having claimed the contrary in Massin (2011). 
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such complete awareness, we would not be in a position to exclude the idea that 
some unpresented part of a’s essence requires b. Put differently: it is not enough 
not to be presented with any part of a’s nature that requires b; one must, further-
more, be positively presented with the fact that this is all there is to a’s nature. 
Such a totalling condition, it seems, is as elusive to perceptual awareness as 
counterfactual situations. The appeal to an essential account of mind-independ-
ence saves us from one difficulty only to land us in another: we have expunged 
modal content at the price of introducing an equally suspicious totalling content.  
I conclude that Berkeley, Hume, and Reid were right to hold that perception 
cannot present us with the mind-independency of its objects. Does it follow that 
Johnson’s refutation is rebutted? Only if “feel” in P1’ is a perceptual verb. How-
ever, there is good reason to think that Johnson was calling our attention to a 
distinct sort of non-perceptual (or at least not only perceptual) experience. For 
suppose that Johnson only had in mind some ordinary tactile experience of the 
stone—such as feeling the pressure or solidity of the stone. What then would be 
the reason for kicking the stone, instead of merely pointing at it? It is hard to see. 
After all, it is unclear why touch should be in a better position than sight or hear-
ing when it comes to the presentation of the mind-independency of its objects. 
Against the view that some sensory modalities are trust-worthier than others, 
Gibson (1966: 55) notices that: “To kick a stone is no better guarantee of its pres-
ence than to see it”.11 If Johnson’s kick is to avoid this worry, the relevant experi-
ence that ensues from it had better be of a non-perceptual kind. 
Owing to this, Johnson must be calling our attention to something other—or 
something more—than mere tactile experience. What is this special experience 
that presents us with the mind-independence of the stone? In Scheler’s words:  
(1) What is the givenness of reality? What is experienced [erlebt], when anything whatever 
is experienced as real? This is the question of the phenomenology of the lived-experience 
of reality. (2) In what sorts of acts or modes of human behavior is the factor of reality [Re-
alitätsmoment] originally given? (Scheler 1973 [1927]: 313) 
!! 
11 Cf. Destutt de Tracy, 1801, pp. 113–4.  
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% Experiencing Mind-Independence: the Feeling 
of Resistance 
Johnson’s suggested answer is, I submit: the experience of resistance to our volun-
tary effort.12 (This, incidentally, is also the answer endorsed by Scheler). Call this 
the Resistance Thesis: 
Resistance Thesis: the feeling of the resistance of the stone against our volun-
tary effort presents us with the independency of the stone from our mind. 
On an historical note, one of the first explicit formulations of this thesis is to 
be found in the work of the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy (1803): “What 
ensures us of the existence of beings other than us is their resistance to our acting 
will”. The view became very influential in many different areas and schools of 
thought (see Massin 2018, for a detailed list of references). Indeed, fewer than 80 
years later, James (1880) writes: “There is no commoner remark than this, that 
resistance to our muscular effort is the only sense which makes us aware of a 
reality independent from ourselves.” Although some anticipations of the Re-
sistance Thesis may arguably be found in Malebranche, Hartley, and Condillac13, 
it is fair to say that at the time Johnson kicked the stone, the thesis had not yet 
been explicitly defended. Johnson’s kick, therefore, may constitute the first en-
dorsement of the Resistance Thesis in philosophical history. (As we shall see, the 
Resistance Thesis is not to be conflated with the cognate view, endorsed by Berke-
ley, according to which sensible things, contrary to ideas of imaginations, cannot 
be modified at will). 
What, then, is an experience of resistance? Paradigmatic experiences of re-
sistance occur when we carry a heavy bag, when we swim against the stream, or 
!! 
12 This is also the interpretation of Johnson’s kick endorsed by Bain (1855: 377), Patey (1986), 
Baldwin (1995), Williams (2002, 136). Hallett defends a cognate but distinct interpretation, ac-
cording to which “the essence of [Johnson’s] argument is plainly the inference from his own ex-
perienced physical agency with that of the stone (with which it is the same in kind)”. Although 
there is a lot to be said in favour of Hallett’s interpretation—as we shall see—I believe that the 
agency of the stone is not inferred from the experience of our own agency, but that both are ex-
perienced together. 
13 Malebranche (1991 [1687]: 40-43) argues that if resistance to our physical effort gives us rea-
son to believe in the reality of solid bodies, then, a fortiori, resistance to our will should give us 
reason to believe in the reality of ideas.13 Hartley (1749) introduces the genetic question of how 
the self distinguishes itself from the external world, hinting at the role of muscular feelings; Con-
dillac (1997 [1754], part II, chap. V) argues that it is only when equipped with effortful touch and 
capacity of motion that his statue becomes aware of a world distinct from itself.   
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when we hold back a pram on a staircase. I shall here assume the following views 
(for a full defence see: Massin 2010; Massin 2018; and Massin & de Vignemont, 
forthcoming). 
1. A body, B, resists an agent, A, iff A makes an effort on B. 
2. A makes an effort on a body B=df 
(i) A exerts a force F1 on B in order to make it (or some of its parts) move (or stay 
at rest); 
(ii) A resistive force F2 partly or fully counteracts the force F1 exerted by A.14 
This corresponds to the following schema: 
 
Fig. 1: The structure of an effort 
When Johnson kicked the stone, he exerted a force on it (not least a “mighty” one, 
according to Boswell), and the stone exerted in return a resistive force, causing 
his foot to rebound. The relation between the two forces at stake here—the one 
exerted by the agent and the one exerted by the stone—is a relation of mutual 
!! 
14 NB: fully counteracted efforts are not necessarily failures. One might make an effort to ensure 
that the body does not move. And partly counteracted efforts might be failures, e.g., if we wanted 
the body to stay where it is. 
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causal prevention: each force prevents the other from causing the acceleration of 
the stone it would have cause, had it acted alone (Massin 2017). 
Now, experiencing resistance (or effort) is experiencing all of this: it is to ex-
perience that, in response to the force that one exerts in trying to move it, the 
stone exerts a resistive force.  Why, then, should the experience of resistance give 
us a presentation of mind-independence? Simply put, if the body on which we 
act opposes and resists us, this suffices to show that it is not under the immediate 
control of our will. Unlike (many) ideas of our imagination, physical bodies do 
not comply with our demands without resistance (resistance that may or may not 
be insuperable). The behaviour of bodies is partly independent of our will. 
Owing to this, P1’ is vindicated: by kicking the stone, Johnson experiences its 
resistance to his will, which amounts to an experience of its mind-independence. 
From this and P2 (the anti-sceptical premise granted by Berkeley), Johnson con-
cludes that the stone is mind-independent. Is Berkeley thereby refuted? 
! One Dialogue Between George and Samuel 
George. I read your “refutation”, dear Samuel. It is rather terse, but here is my 
best reconstruction of it: because the stone resists your will, it appears to you to 
exist outside of your mind. And this, you think, contradicts my immaterialism. 
Tell me, Samuel: did I get you right? 
Samuel. Absolutely! 
George. In that case, I am afraid your “refutation” does not contradict me in the 
least. For I have never denied that the stone exists independently from my will. 
Quite the contrary! This is precisely how I distinguish ideas of the senses—such 
as your stone—from ideas of imagination. The latter, but not the former, are de-
pendent on our will.15 You are equivocating, I fear, between two forms of depend-
ency on our mind: the dependency of sensory things on our perception, which I 
defend, and the dependency of sensory things on our will – which, like you – I 
reject. 
Samuel. You seem to me to be the one equivocating here between two senses of 
“independence from our will”. For in the sense I have in mind, your ideas of per-
ception do not oppose the slightest resistance to my will. The stone does. 
!! 
15 Three Dialogues, 235. 
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George. What? If ideas of perception do not resist your will, then explain to me, 
pray, how you manage to see the sky green or my face square?16 
Samuel. I happily confess that I cannot. But this inability of mine is not owing to 
colours resisting my endeavours to change them. 
George. What else? 
Samuel. My aboulia, George. 
George. I am very sorry to hear that Samuel, I had no idea. 
Samuel. This is no disease of mine, good George. It is our normal human condi-
tion with respect to colours and other sensible qualities. The source of the impos-
sibility to modify colours at will does not lie in their resistance. It lies in the limits 
of our will: colour changes are not the kinds of changes that we can will. 
George. And are you going to claim that pain, for which we have the strongest 
aversion, can never become an object of our will either? How absurd! Don’t you 
want your pain to cease? 
Samuel. Desiring, wanting…none of this is willing. I do desire and want the ces-
sation of my pain. But I cannot will it. To will to modify a thing, I must be able to 
directly act on it. How else could this thing resist my will? I know how to make a 
stone move: I should push it, or kick it. But, unfortunately, I cannot immediately 
act on my pain. Hence, stones, but not pains, can resist my will.  
George. So long as in both cases things fail to comply with our will, I do not see 
much of a difference here. 
Samuel. But my point is precisely that these are two very different ways for things 
to fail to comply with our will. Being deaf to orders is not the same as refusing to 
obey them. Among the things that cannot be modified at will, some are beyond 
its reach, others are resistant to it. To ideas of the senses (contrary to ideas of 
imagination) belong the first ones—you are right. But the stone I kicked displays 
another kind of independence from my will: I acted on it and it resisted. 
George. Perhaps Samuel, perhaps. But will you stop splitting hairs and tell me 
now how these fine-grained distinctions between varieties of will-independency 
can help you to prove the perception-independency of sensible things? 
Samuel. We are nearly there. Note, first, that the fact that the stone resists my 
effort directly runs counter to two theses of yours. 
George. Well! Which ones? 
Samuel. What is resistance if not a force? 
George. I cannot see what else it could be. 
Samuel. So, if resistance can be felt and is a force, forces are neither abstractions 
nor occult qualities, as you claim. They are sensible things. 
!! 
16 Principles, §29; Three Dialogues, 196. 
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George. I reluctantly grant this to you. For my view that forces are abstractions is 
anyway incidental to my immaterialism: put forces in the same group as colours, 
shapes, and sounds if it befits you. Forces will, then, be sensible things depend-
ing on our perception of them.  While we are here, put as many other chimeras 
among sensible things as you please: unless their independency from perception 
is itself perceived – an obvious impossibility – it will remain true that their esse 
is percipi. 
Samuel. You underestimate, George, how much your immaterialism depends on 
your view about forces. To see that, consider the second claim of yours that the 
resistance of the stone contradicts. 
George. Now! Which scholium of mine are you going to attack this time? 
Samuel.  The view that only minds are active. Do you still accept this? 
George. I surely do! Only minds can produce effects on nature; no sensible thing, 
be that solidity, figure, motion…can produce any effect in another sensible 
thing.17 
Samuel. But I felt the resistance of the stone, and since appearances are not de-
ceiving, the stone has to be endowed with some causal power. The stone seems 
to have – and therefore actually has – the power of exerting forces against what 
strikes it. 
George. Truth be told, I cannot make sense of the idea of a stone being active and 
resisting your effort. When I kick things, I feel discomfort, pain;18 I experience the 
constant conjunction between the motions of my foot and that of other corporeal 
things, but I experience nothing like a force or resistance actively exerted by 
them. Sensible things are visibly inactive.19 
Samuel. Not muscularly! Don’t you feel tensions in your muscles? 
George. This strikes me as a highly implausible description of what I experience, 
but I am ready to grant it to you as well—on one condition, however. 
Samuel. What is it to be? 
George. That you stop attacking my turrets, and that you finally launch your as-
sault against my dungeon: will you tell me at last how all of this is relevant to 
your self-proclaimed refutation of my immaterialism, and not to you rejecting 
some side-theses of mine? 
Samuel. Here is the problem, George. Consider the motion of my foot. This mo-
tion, you maintain, depends on its being perceived. But my foot was repelled by 
the stone, as you conceded. Hence its motion is also explained by the resistive 
!! 
17 Principle, §61; Three Dialogues, 196 
18 An Essay on Motion, §4.  
19 Principles, §25. 
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force exerted by the stone. The same bounce ends up being explained twice: once 
by the activity of the soul, the other by the force of the stone. There is one princi-
ple of motion too many.20  
George. Hold on, Samuel. The soul is real, but the force isn’t. I granted you—re-
luctantly—that forces, instead of being abstractions, are sensible things; I never 
conceded that forces can exist unperceived!  
Samuel. But I am not relying on that hypothesis, George. There are two main ways 
in which philosophers have tried to make sense of the notion of real being. Those 
who, following the Eleatic stranger of Plato’s Sophist, said that being real is to 
have causal power; and those who said that to be real is to exist independently 
from perception. I claim that those two criteria of reality are not independent: 
being endowed with causal powers entails existing independently from percep-
tion.  
George. How so?  
Samuel. Once sensible things are acknowledged to have causal powers, they start 
banging against each other and have a causal life of their own. Perception be-
comes incidental to the explanation of their behaviour, which amounts to saying 
that their behaviour is independent from perception. 
George. That would be true if sensible things had causal powers. But I doubt that 
your inference to the effect that sensible things have causal powers is correct.  
Samuel. But I am drawing no inference George: that sensible things have causal 
powers is something we know by experience: kick a stone! 
George. Ideas may seem to bang against each other to you, but as a matter of fact 
they don’t: only minds affect ideas.  
Samuel. Can ideas seem to be one way and be another? 
George. Certainly not. 
Samuel. So, if ideas seem to affect each other, they do. 
George. That is precisely the point, Samuel: you and I disagree on appearances. 
Ideas, I maintain, do not seem to act on each other. Indeed, I conceded the con-
trary to you, and I am grateful to you for having helped me see how tightly con-
nected my immaterialism and views about forces and activity are. But don’t be 
too quick to shout victory. For all that you have shown is that immaterialism is 
false under a far-fetched description of sensory appearances. 
Samuel. Far-fetched? 
George. To say the least! It is not just appearances that you overloaded with kooky 
ideas of forces and powers: the very concept of an active body is so extravagant 
that only metaphysicians desperate enough to distinguish themselves from the 
!! 
20 See Winkler (1994: 116) for a close consideration. 
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vulgar would endorse it. Frankly, Samuel, an obstructing being, so powerful as 
to oppose invincible resistance to your most resolute endeavours, so alert as to 
immediately react to your smallest pushes, so recalcitrant as to thwart all your 
attempts: what else could it be but another mind? 
Samuel. A stone! 
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